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 Computer system trespassing is a growing concern, but it has received little 
criminological attention. The present study discusses the results of an experiment which 
looked at system trespasser behavior after exposure to one of three warning messages (or 
no message) in the context of deterrence theory. One message consisted of an attempt at 
moral persuasion; the second a generic legal warning, and the third an ambiguous threat. 
Keystroke data was analyzed to assess how the type of message affected the employment 
of restrictive deterrent techniques designed to limit trespasser activity on a compromised 
system. It was found that moral persuasion generally reduces both the incidence and 
frequency of command entry by trespassers on an illegally accessed system, while legal 
and ambiguous warnings produce no significant differences from the control condition. 
This suggests that in order to reduce trespasser activity, system administrators should use 
moral persuasion instead of legal sanction threats. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Cybercrime is a growing problem worldwide with significant financial 
ramifications. Indeed the total cost to United States companies from cybercrime in 2013 
has been estimated at $11,560,000, representing a 26% net increase in cost compared to 
the previous year (Ponemon Institute, 2013). Additionally, invasion of privacy has also 
become a common global problem, with almost one in five people in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom experiencing the hacking of an online account in the 
previous year (Bursztein, 2013; Hernandez-Castro and Boiten, 2013). However even 
these estimates of the extent of cybercrime probably understate the problem, since our 
knowledge of the true extent of cybercrime is impaired by the anonymous and boundless 
nature of cyberspace (Yar, 2006). Despite growing public awareness of the threat of 
privacy invasion and cyber attacks, there has been little concerted criminal justice effort 
to effectively counter cybercrime, and it has gone largely ignored within the field of 
criminology (Choi, 2011). 
 The few attempts to apply traditional criminological theory to cybercrime have 
for the most part explored computer victimization with reference to the Routine Activities 
Theory of Cohen and Felson (Choi, 2010, 2011; Cohen and Felson, 1979). By contrast, 
the current paper explores not criminal victimization but commission, investigating how 
deterrence theory might be applied to cyberspace. Specifically this work focuses on how 
sanction threats, in the form of warning banners, may affect the behavior of ‘system 
trespassers’ (those who illegally enter into a computer or network) after they have 
compromised and gained access to a computer system (their “post-compromise” 
behavior). Rather than using the classical model of deterrence, where the act either 
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proceeds in spite of or is omitted in toto because of a sanction threat, the focus in the 
present work is on exploring the more recent concept of restrictive deterrence (Gibbs, 
1975; Jacobs, 1996a, 1996b, 2010) where the circumscribed behavior continues despite 
the sanction threat but responds to it in any one of a number of ways. 
 The present experiment consists of a randomized trial using a set of target-
computers purpose-built for being attacked. Three experimental conditions were 
employed (one of three different warning banners displayed when a system trespasser 
enters the computer system for the first time) in addition to one control condition (no 
warning banner displayed). The three experimental conditions allow comparison of the 
ways in which an ‘altruistic’ appeal to morality, a threat of legal sanctions and an 
ambiguously threatening message affect trespasser behavior. This work is the first to look 
not only at the effects of warning banners on the progression of a system trespassing 
event but also at the individual-level keystroke data of system trespassers. It seeks to 
ascertain what type of warning message will result in a reduction of criminal activity on 
an illegally accessed computer system. It is hoped that the findings reached will inform 
policy on computer and network safety. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 System Trespassing 
 System trespassing involves the unauthorized entry into a computer or network by 
someone who does not have access rights (Brenner, 2010). Instead of ‘system 
trespassing’ the term ‘hacking’ (or ‘cracking’) is often used (Yar, 2006). System 
trespassers search for susceptible target computers through methods such as port 
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scanning, where they use the internet to look for open ports into networks which might 
provide points of entry into the system (Lee et al., 2003). Once the trespasser has gained 
unauthorized access to a system, either locally (by physically accessing it) or, more 
commonly, remotely (by utilizing an internet connection), the individual may conduct 
any number of a range of activities related to computer intrusion, manipulation and 
disruption (Yar, 2006). 
The motivations attributed variously to system trespassers by law enforcement, 
the public and trespassers themselves have been described as “wide-ranging and often 
contradictory” (Yar, 2005:391). Law enforcement descriptions of the activities of system 
trespassers tend to focus on the malicious or destructive nature of certain acts, while 
trespassers themselves often characterize their actions as being conducted in the pursuit 
of knowledge and in support of freedom of information (Yar, 2005). All that can be 
stated with any certainty is that trespassers may enter systems for the purposes of 
exploration, information, sabotage or curiosity; to steal resources or information, store 
resources or information, alter or sabotage the system, deface websites, distribute 
malicious software, protest against restrictions on information, improve computer 
security by exposing flaws, flaunt their own skillset, gain recognition from other 
cybercriminals, make a political statement, feel powerful and in control, or any 
combination of these factors (Chiesa et al., 2009; Loader, 2000; Taylor, 1999; Yar, 
2006). 
Whatever motives are attributed to them, it seems that system trespassers are 
generally viewed by the law, the public and themselves as rational actors who engage in 
hacking with the expectation of some sort of reward (whether that be information, the 
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ability to perpetrate further attacks or to satiate curiosity) (Yar, 2005, 2006). This renders 
them theoretically open to being deterred by sanction threats. The legal response to 
system trespassing in the USA and other Western societies has been consistent with 
deterrence theory inasmuch as formal sanctions have been implemented in the hopes of 
deterring system trespassing - most notably through the American 1986 Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, which allows for up to ten years’ imprisonment for computer offenses 
(Kerr, 2009). 
 
2.2 Deterrence Theory 
Deterrence theory has its roots in the writings of the 18th century philosophers 
Jeremy Bentham (1948 [1789]) and Cesare Beccaria (1963 [1764]) who proposed that 
humans were self-interested and rational-thinking, driven in their actions by an 
economical ‘hedonistic calculus’ whereby they act so as to maximize pleasure and 
minimize pain (Bentham, 1948 [1789]; Paternoster, 2010; Tombs and Whyte, 2013). This 
theoretically renders individuals open to ‘deterrence’ inasmuch as raising the costs of a 
behavior through sanctions should lower their willingness to pursue that course of action. 
Ultimately, the theory predicts that when the costs outweigh the benefits an individual 
should refrain from acting altogether (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]; Zimring and Hawkins, 
1973). 
Contemporary deterrence and rational choice scholarship has yielded six main 
areas of research development: 
One is a more detailed consideration of Beccaria’s (1963 [1764]) bifurcation of 
specific and general deterrence, where specific deterrence is the cessation or curtailment 
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of an individual’s criminal activity in response to a legal sanction applied to the offender 
(Andenaes, 1974; Gibbs, 1975; Paternoster and Piquero, 1995), and general deterrence is 
the cessation or curtailment of criminal offending on the part of potential offenders due to 
the prescription of legal sanctions (combined with known enforcement of those 
sanctions) (Andenaes, 1966; Paternoster and Piquero, 1995). However work by Stafford 
and Warr (1993) suggests that the division is artificial and unnecessary, and that both 
direct (specific) and indirect (general) deterrence affect individual offenders (see for 
example Anwar and Loughran, 2011; Loughran et al., 2011a). 
A second key development has been the recognition that most (if not all) 
individuals are incapable of employing the sort of pure mathematical cognitive process in 
decision-making implied by Beccaria (1963 [1764]) and that humans act with a 
rationality ‘bounded’ or limited by their lack of access to complete information 
(Cherniak, 1986; Simon, 1972). Indeed empirical research has shown that human 
decisions are affected by non-rational concerns such as the manner in which risks are 
described and miscalculations regarding cumulative probabilities of punishment (Casey 
and Scholtz, 1991; see also Loughran et al., 2011b). 
A third development has been the adoption of a perceptual approach to the study 
of deterrence, where it has been recognized that measuring the individual’s perception of 
the certainty and severity of punishment is more relevant to calculating a deterrent effect 
than merely measuring the objective risk or severity (Becker, 1968; Paternoster, 1987; 
Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Pogarsky et al. (2004) indicated that objective sanctions are 
connected to behavioral outcomes through two separate links – a perceptual link between 
the sanction and the offender’s perception about the risks and costs of punishment, and a 
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behavioral link between that perception and their behavior. Both of these must be present 
for an objective sanction to translate into deterrence. Empirical work has generally also 
found, consistent with Beccaria’s (1963 [1764]) predictions, that perceived certainty of 
sanction has a greater deterrent effect than perceived severity of sanction (Anderson et 
al., 1977; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; Paternoster, 1987; Tittle, 
1969; but see qualifications to this in Piquero and Pogarsky, 2002; Pogarsky, 2002). 
Some recent work in the field of perceived certainty has examined the role of 
ambiguity in weakening or enhancing perceptions of certainty. Generally studies suggest 
that individuals are ‘ambiguity adverse’, preferring to gamble with known risks as 
opposed to uncertain ones (Loughran et al., 2011b). In line with evidence that human 
decision-making is not entirely rational (Simon, 1972), it has been found that ambiguity 
enhances the deterrent effect of low risks (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shimizu, 
2007). Casey and Scholz find evidence of a ‘boundary effect’, whereby vagueness makes 
tax noncompliance more attractive when the probability of detection is very high (>90%) 
but less attractive when the probability of detection is very low (<10%) (1991:838). In a 
more recent study, Loughran et al. (2011b) recalculate these boundary effects, also 
finding evidence that ambiguity enhances the deterrent effect of low risks (<20%), and 
reduces the deterrent effect of high risks (>80%). 
Research on ambiguity of perceived severity is less developed, being largely 
intertwined with work on perceived certainty of loss or gain, but with general findings 
that it is the probability of gaining (as opposed to losing) rather than the size of the gain 
that has a greater influence on decision-making (Liu and Colman, 2009). However much 
of this work involves experimenting with differing levels of gain rather than with loss. 
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Recent work on loss aversion itself has found that people are risk-prone towards small 
potential losses or gains and risk-averse when confronted with large potential losses or 
gains (Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre, 2006). The premise of deterrence theory is that a 
legal sanction constitutes a relatively severe ‘loss’ and thus, when confronted with the 
potential for legal sanction, people will generally be risk-adverse. There is little research 
explicitly testing the effect of ambiguity of sanction level on human behavior in the 
absence of ambiguity of certainty, although Casey and Scholz’s (1991) paper suggests 
that ambiguity of penalty severity has a similar effect to ambiguity of probability of 
detection. They found that ambiguity serves to increase the chances of noncompliance 
when the penalty estimate is high but reduces the chances of noncompliance when the 
penalty estimate is low. Thus ambiguity of perceived certainty and severity seem to 
operate in a largely similar and complementary manner. 
A fourth area is that of the relative impact of informal sanctions as compared to 
the formal sanctions specified in the traditional deterrence model, with some work 
suggesting that the main deterrent effect of formal sanctions derives from the attendant 
informal sanctions suffered by individuals upon arrest or imprisonment such as social 
ostracization and shaming (Erickson et al., 1977; Kleck et al., 2005; Nagin and Pogarsky, 
2001; Tittle and Rowe, 1974; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). 
Fifth, some work has examined deterrability, or how individual characteristics 
may render some people more or less susceptible to deterrence processes dependent upon 
their level of impulsivity, commitment to crime or future orientation (Chambliss, 1967; 
Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster, 2010; Wright et al., 2004). 
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Finally, a sixth development has been the further bifurcation of deterrence into 
absolute and restrictive deterrence, proposed by Gibbs (1975) and further developed 
primarily by Jacobs (1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2010). Whilst the other developments in 
deterrence theory have some background importance to the way in which deterrent 
processes are conceptualized for the purposes of this study, the present work explicitly 
engages with and empirically assesses the relevance of restrictive deterrence in a cyber 
context. 
 
2.3 Restrictive Deterrence 
In his classic (1975) work, Gibbs differentiates between absolute and restrictive 
deterrence. Absolute deterrence essentially constitutes the classical model of deterrence, 
where an individual engages in no criminal activity due to the fear induced by some 
perceived risk of punishment. Restrictive deterrence, on the other hand, is the curtailment 
of a certain type of criminal activity at least in part in order to try and reduce the risk of 
punishment (Gibbs, 1975). Whilst Gibbs (1975) argued that restrictive deterrence is a 
function of specific deterrence, Jacobs (1996a) proposed that it might be a function of 
specific or general deterrence separately, or indeed both together. An individual does not, 
therefore, have to have suffered punishment themselves in order to experience restrictive 
deterrence. 
The core idea of restrictive deterrence is that, if it is operative, one will see not the 
omission of an act but its curtailment. This was suggested by Gibbs (1975) to primarily 
constitute a reduction in the frequency of the act, with the expectation (based on a 
probabilistic style of decision-making) that less offending translates into fewer chances 
	   9	  
for detection and arrest. However, later work by Jacobs (1993, 1996a) problematizes this 
assumption of ‘probabilistic’ restrictive deterrence. His ethnographic work with drug 
dealers suggests an absence of this “law of averages” mentality and reveals that criminals 
curtail their drug dealing primarily due to their employment of strategic tactics used to 
identify (and avoid) high-risk targets rather than any consideration of their long-term 
odds of punishment (Jacobs, 1993; see also Johnson and Natarajan, 1995; VanNostrand 
and Tewksbury, 1999). This builds on a footnote by Gibbs (1975) that suggests the 
potential for a reduction in offense frequency due to “any strategies or tactics employed 
by individuals to evade detection, identification, or apprehension” (Gibbs, 1975:33). 
Jacobs (1996a) labels this ‘particularistic’ restrictive deterrence. 
Gibbs (1975) assumes that arrest avoidance strategies prompted by restrictive 
deterrence concerns will translate into less crime due to a reduction in frequency of 
offending. However Jacobs (1993) stresses that restrictive deterrence may not always 
effect a net reduction in crime, but in some instances may merely cause its displacement 
to other points in time and space that are perceived by offenders as constituting less of a 
risk for punishment. Cherbonneau and Copes (2006) similarly conclude, based on their 
study of auto thieves, that using restrictive deterrent strategies may in fact lead to 
persistence in offending as the offender feels more confident in committing crimes with a 
(perceived) lower chance of arrest. 
Other ethnographic work similarly suggests that restrictive deterrent effects may 
not necessarily translate into reduced frequency of offending, but may alter offenders’ 
behavior during criminal commission as they attempt to avoid detection and arrest. For 
example, Wright and Decker (1994) found that the threat of legal sanction did not prevent 
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burglars from committing an offense but reduced the amount of time they spent 
committing the crime, while Gallupe et al. (2011) found that some drug offenders 
switched the location of their transactions or the drug-type sold in response to arrest – 
although this did not necessarily constitute a reduction in the severity of the offense (see 
also Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2012). 
Jacobs (2010) ultimately draws the various threads of the literature together and 
delineates four ways in which restrictive deterrence may affect criminal behavior: First, 
where the offender reduces offending frequency (as suggested by Gibbs, 1975); second, 
where the offender commits acts of reduced severity in order to minimize punishment 
severity; third, where the offender engages in situational measures to try and avoid 
detection or arrest; and fourth, where the offender displaces their activity to another time 
or place. Particularistic restrictive deterrent responses may thus variously have the effect 
of reducing criminal activity; of affecting not its volume or frequency but its location or 
severity; or indeed of increasing its volume or frequency, depending on the type of 
response envisaged. 
For the purposes of the current study, the first of Jacobs’ (2010) restrictive 
deterrence techniques is the most relevant, inasmuch as the present work examines the 
post-compromise behavior of attackers with attention to the amount and frequency of the 
commands they enter on the system. One might suspect that some of the commands 
entered by attackers may be motivated by a desire to avoid detection in line with Jacobs’ 
(2010) third type of particularistic restrictive deterrent response, and that this may in fact 
result in an increase of certain commands entered onto the system as the trespasser takes 
extra measures to scout for potential detectors or to conceal his/her own activity. 
	   11	  
However, without access to the attacker’s mind one cannot tell whether, for example, the 
use of a command to edit the timestamp on a file is done with malicious intent or as a 
means to conceal the attacker’s activity and avoid detection. To avoid such speculation, 
the present work focuses on assessing restrictive deterrence inasmuch as it brings about a 
reduction in offending, whether because of a probabilistic calculation of long-term odds 
or a desire to evade detection by limiting illegal activity on systems identified as ‘high-
risk’ by trespassers, in line with Jacobs’ (1993) work on particularistic restrictive 
deterrence. The majority of the work on both probabilistic and particularistic restrictive 
deterrence supports this expectation of a perceived reduction in offending activity in 
response to a sanction threat, at least on the monitored system (there is no way to 
measure its displacement to other systems in line with Jacobs’ (2010) fourth 
particularistic restrictive deterrence response, for example). 
 Most of the work discussing restrictive deterrence is qualitative in nature and 
utilizes relatively small samples (Beauregard and Bouchard, 2010; Jacobs, 1993, 1996a, 
1996b; Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2012). The present work, by contrast, offers some 
empirical analysis of restrictive deterrent techniques, particularly as they result from 
specific situational cues - for the present study, in the form of warning messages. 
 
2.4 Warning Messages and Deterrence 
Geerken and Gove emphasize the importance of regarding deterrence not just as a 
perceptual process inside the mind of the individual, but as a “mechanism of information 
transmission” between the sanctioning agent and the individual (Geerken and Gove, 
1975:498). Indeed “[t]he success of any deterrence process will be determined by the 
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degree to which this message is successfully transmitted to the population of potential 
offenders” (Geerken and Gove, 1975:499). While this may be overstating the matter 
somewhat, since sanctions will have a differential effect dependent on the characteristics 
of each individual and their level of ‘deterrability’ (Geerken and Gove, 1975; Pogarsky, 
2002), it is certainly true that in order for legal sanctions to have any deterrent effect, its 
presence must be communicated to the population of would-be offenders. It is 
unfortunate, therefore, that the perceptions of sanction severity and certainty held by the 
general public (and the offender population) are often wildly inaccurate (Kleck et al., 
2005). However the use of warning messages provides an opportunity to both inform a 
potential offender of the presence of a legal sanction, and even to transmit information 
regarding the certainty and/or severity of that punishment, dependent upon the wording 
of the message. 
There has been considerable work assessing the effectiveness of warning 
messages on criminal and deviant incidents in the physical world, with mixed results 
(Borland, 1997; Janis and Feisbach, 1953; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Schultz and 
Tabanico, 2009; Slemerd et al. 2001). In some cases the presence of warnings has been 
found to increase the non-conformist behavior, which has been variously attributed to the 
“forbidden fruit” effect, whereby moral injunctions about the inappropriateness of certain 
behaviors perversely make those behaviors seem more appealing (Grabosky, 1996; 
Zimring and Hawkins, 1973) and the “advertising” or promotion of that behavior by its 
mere mention, creating a ‘descriptive norm’ which encourages individuals to adopt the 
behavior regardless of the ‘injunctive norm’ prohibiting it (Cialdani, 1990, 2003; 
Grabosky, 1996; Keizer et al. 2008). 
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However most of the work on the deterrent effect of warnings has focused on an 
investigation of their absolute deterrent effects, with little consideration of any restrictive 
deterrent effects such as duration of offence or the specific actions committed (although 
see Maimon et al., 2014). Additionally, despite the prevalence of online sanction threats, 
little work has addressed cyber-deterrence at all, let alone the specific impact of warning 
messages in cyberspace. 
A considerable body of work has compared the efficacy of sanction threats with 
that of messages intending to employ techniques of moral persuasion, predominantly with 
respect to tax law compliance and student cheating. The findings have been somewhat 
mixed, with some (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967) finding evidence that moral persuasions 
are more effective at reducing deviant behavior than sanction threats, and others finding 
the opposite (Tittle and Rowe, 1973). Meanwhile Paternoster and Simpson (1996) 
concluded that a combination of sanction threat and moral persuasion was necessary to 
encourage compliance; however Ariel (2010) found no effect of either on tax compliance. 
 
2.5 Deterrence in Cyberspace 
Previous empirical work on deterrence in cyberspace is almost non-existent 
(although for a recent exception see Maimon et al., 2014). There has been, however, a 
considerable body of work in the realm of cyberdefense investigating the potential for 
deterrent strategies involving denial of attack by preventing an attack or rendering it 
futile, and penalty (including the threat of retaliation) (Goodman, 2010). This work 
emphasizes the importance of credibility – the would-be deterrer must have both the 
capacity and the intent to enforce penalties in order for them to act as an effective 
	   14	  
deterrent (Goodman, 2010). Whether it concerns nation against nation or an individual 
hacker against another individual’s system, the main problem associated with a cyber 
deterrence strategy is that of credibility, given the lack of capability and intent 
demonstrated by the legal system when it comes to tackling (especially small-scale) 
cybercrime. First, it would seem that the legality of system trespassing and related acts, 
and their associated penalties in criminal law are not necessarily particularly well-known 
among the general public or the hacking community (see, for example, Furnell, 2002). 
This constitutes a problem for deterrence, given that it is premised upon the individual 
knowing their act is punishable by law (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]). Second, youth surveys 
reveal that even those who know of the illegality of their actions do not seem deterred, 
since a significant number of young people participate in various computer-related 
offences and that there is little stigma attached to cybercrime (Choi, 2010; Taylor, 1999; 
Yar, 2005). 
Harknett (1996) states that “[d]eterrence weakens to the degree that the deterrent 
capability can be contested through degradation or avoidance”, and perhaps the greatest 
problem for cyber-deterrence is that the inherently anonymous nature of cyberspace 
drastically increases the ability of individuals to avoid detection. Many attacks will go 
undetected even by the victim; ‘policing’, such as it exists in cyberspace, is minimal, and 
formal criminal justice agents lack the resources and knowledge to effectively regulate 
cyberspace (Choi, 2010). The credibility of legal responses to cyber threats is undercut 
both by the relative scarcity of prosecutions brought against cybercrime, and (with the 
exception of a couple of high-profile cases) by the reluctance of the criminal justice 
system to invoke legal provisions to their full extent when individuals are prosecuted 
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(Chiesa et al., 2009; Yar, 2006). Hackers themselves do not tend to think their 
governments take their actions seriously (Chiesa et al., 2009). Additionally, hackers are 
able to disguise not only their identity but their location through the use of techniques 
such as “looping”, whereby they use one computer system to access another, and then 
that to access another, and so on. Especially where this crosses national boundaries, it 
makes it difficult if not impossible to locate where an attack originated (Denning and 
Baugh, 2000). 
However cyber deterrence is not necessarily a ‘lost cause’. There has been some 
argument that it is not necessary to identify specific individuals for deterrence to take 
effect (Goodman, 2010), and hackers have generally been presumed to demonstrate 
rational decision-making, evidenced by their actions. Once they have entered a system, 
hackers may first try to erase the record of their intrusion and then build a ‘backdoor’ into 
the system so they can exit and re-enter the system at will (Chiesa et al., 2009; Wang, 
2003). Their attempts to avoid detection suggest a mindfulness of the need to employ 
restrictive deterrence tactics similar to those described by Jacobs in his work on drug 
dealers (Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 1993, 1996a, 1996b) and the ‘forensic awareness’ 
techniques utilized by street criminals (Beauregard and Bouchard, 2010). Hackers may, 
therefore, be responsive to some deterrence strategies, particularly when reminded of the 
illegality of their actions and the potential consequences by a warning message. Further 
evidence in support of this conclusion has been offered by Maimon et al.’s (2014) study 
of the effect of a single warning banner on system trespasser behavior, where it was 
found that although the banner did not lead to immediate termination of a session or a 
reduction in the frequency of trespassing incidents, the duration of such incidents was 
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reduced. This is consistent with the work of Wright and Decker (1994) on restrictive 
deterrence in the context of burglary. The present study goes beyond Maimon et al.’s 
(2014) work to examine both the effects of multiple warning messages, and the details of 
system trespasser behavior once the system has been accessed. 
 
3. THE PRESENT STUDY 
 Before logging onto computers on university and governmental networks, a 
banner is often displayed detailing the terms of access and penalties for improper use 
(NIST 2009). Given the wide use of such banners there appears to be an implicit 
assumption that these methods of deterrence will be effective in reducing criminal 
computer activity, but the veracity of this assumption and the extent of the deterrent 
effect of such warnings have only recently started to undergo theoretical testing (see 
Maimon et al., 2014 for perhaps the first such work). The present study seeks to 
empirically test the effectiveness of different warning banner content in mitigating 
system trespassing events. Specifically, I explore whether a threatening warning banner is 
more effective in deterring system trespassers behaviors on the system in comparison to 
banners attempting to reduce crime by moral persuasion, and banners that carry an 
ambiguous threat. Since one cannot know the thought process or circumstances of 
individual system trespassers, who might be located anywhere in the world, one cannot 
claim that system trespassers immediately leaving the system after encountering a 
warning banner constitutes absolute deterrence. Although measuring absolute deterrence 
is difficult, it is possible to identify and investigate the use of techniques of restrictive 
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deterrence, as described by Gibbs (1975) and Jacobs (1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2010), across 
the experimental and control conditions. 
  
3.1 Research Hypotheses 
Restrictive deterrent techniques in the context of system trespassing can be 
conceptualized as resulting from both probabilistic and particularistic restrictive 
deterrence (Jacobs 1996a). Probabilistic restrictive deterrence should encourage a 
limiting of the frequency of criminal behavior in order to (it is assumed) reduce the 
likelihood of detection or arrest over the long-term. Thus it might be expected that the 
presence of a warning banner will cause a decrease in the frequency of commands used 
as the individual seeks to avoid detection. There are some arguments from particularistic 
restrictive deterrence that suggest that this is not necessarily the case, and that there may 
be an increase in at least some commands as the individual attempts to conceal their 
activity (see for example Cherbonneau and Copes, 2006). However none of the 
commands considered here are solely designed for the purposes of avoiding detection – 
they all have multiple functions, and ultimately all are being used to effect changes or 
conduct activities illegally on a trespassed system. They are thus all examples of criminal 
behavior, whatever their intended function. Therefore I concentrate on the expected 
restrictive deterrent effect that all command usage should decrease when confronted with 
a warning message in order to reduce the odds of detection. Whether this is because of a 
probabilistic restrictive deterrence response concerned with long-term odds of detection, 
or a particularistic restrictive deterrence response concerned with evading detection in the 
short-term by reducing activity on systems identified as ‘high-risk’, as in Jacobs’ (1993, 
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see also Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 1996a) work on drug dealers, cannot be stated with 
certainty, but the observed results will be the same. 
There is no clear consensus in the theory as to whether a legal sanction threat, 
moral persuasion or an ambiguous threat would have a greater deterrent effect. This is in 
part due to conflicting findings when experiments comparing the effectiveness of legal 
sanctions and moral persuasion on compliance have been conducted (Ariel, 2010; 
Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Tittle and Rowe, 1973) and 
in part because these three conditions have not, to this writer’s knowledge, been 
considered in relation to each other before. However one might expect, given both extant 
theory and previous findings, that a legal sanction threat will increase the use of 
restrictive deterrence techniques (see for example Gallupe et al., 2011; Jacobs, 1993, 
1996a, 1996b; Johnson and Natarajan, 1995; VanNostrand and Tewksbury, 1999; 
Maimon et al, 2014) and so will work to reduce the incidence of criminal and malicious 
activity over time, although (as noted above) there is some conflicting evidence from 
research on particularistic restrictive deterrence on this point (see for example 
Cherbonneau and Copes, 2006). Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A standard legal warning will be associated with a decreased use of 
commands designed to change aspects of the trespassed system, to scout 
the system and to bring files from remote networks onto the system. This 
decrease in command usage will occur as part of a restrictive deterrent 
response designed to limit the chances of detection while on the system. 
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Some research suggests that moral persuasion may be effective in reducing the 
occurrence of criminal activity (Clarke 1996; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996: Schwartz 
and Orleans, 1967, although see Ariel, 2010; Tittle and Rowe, 1973), and therefore we 
may tentatively form the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A moral persuasion message will be associated with a decreased use of 
commands designed to change aspects of the trespassed system, to scout 
the system and to bring files from remote networks onto the system. 
 
The literature on ambiguity in threats suggests that raising the ambiguity of the 
certainty of low-certainty threats increases the perceived certainty (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Loughran et al., 2011). Following deterrence theory, this would also 
increase deterrence. Given that the objective certainty of punishment for computer crime 
is very low, and there is little expectation of punishment (Choi, 2010; Chiesa et al., 2009; 
Yar 2006), it may be assumed that any ambiguity in a warning message related to system 
trespassing will serve to overweight the perceived probability of detection, and that this 
may lead to deterrence. There is little if any literature explicitly discussing the deterrent 
effect of ambiguity of perceived sanction severity in isolation from perceived certainty, 
but one might assume that the potential for any of a number of unspecified punishments 
not merely limited to legal penalties might increase the deterrent effect of a warning 
message. Therefore, the findings here suggest that an ambiguous threat message will 
reduce the occurrence of criminal activity: 
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Hypothesis 3: An ambiguous threat message will be associated with a decrease in the use 
of commands designed to change aspects of the trespassed system, to 
scout the system and to bring files from remote networks onto the system. 
This decrease in command usage will occur as part of a restrictive 
deterrent response designed to limit the chances of detection while on the 
system. 
 
Finally, since the perceived certainty and severity may be heightened for the 
ambiguous threat message as compared to the standard legal sanction message due to the 
way in which the human brain processes ambiguity in the assessment of risk and penalty 
(as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Casey and Scholz, 1991; Loughran et al., 
2011b), one might hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: System trespassers confronted with the ambiguous threat message will 
display a higher rate of use of restrictive deterrence techniques designed to 
reduce criminal activity, as compared to those trespassers confronted with 
a standard legal sanction. This will translate into a decrease in the use of 
commands designed to change aspects of the trespassed system, to scout 
the system and to bring files from remote networks onto the system. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
 An experiment was developed based on a pilot experiment conducted by Maimon 
et al. (2014) which focused on the impact of a single warning message on attackers’ post-
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compromise behavior. The success of this experiment encouraged an increase both in the 
scale of the experiment and its reach, with an expansion to non-American computer 
network infrastructures. The present study utilizes data gathered from a Chinese 
University computer network, where a network of several hundred high-interaction 
‘honeypots’ (a ‘honeynet’) was set up.  
A honeypot is “a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or 
compromised” (Spitzner, 2002). Honeypots typically run on a single computer which 
mimics the activity of a whole network whilst offering easily exploitable flaws to ‘lure’ 
hackers into trespassing (Wang, 2003). As (presumed) rational actors, hackers generally 
look for the easiest computer to break into and then use that to store incriminating files 
and to launch attacks on other systems (Wang, 2003), making honeypots attractive targets 
for them. The honeypots get no legitimate traffic except those users who have entered 
through brute force attacks, so they are an efficient way of gathering attack data (IEEE 
Computer Society, 2003; Spitzner, 2003). As compared to a low-interaction honeypot 
(which tends to be used for production purposes), high-interaction honeypots such as 
those used in the present study are primarily used for research purposes since they are 
able to capture extensive information on attacker behavior without making any 
assumptions about how the attacker will behave (Spitzner, 2003). 
 While there is a dearth of previous empirical research on deterrence and warning 
messages in cyberspace, in the past decade there have been a number of studies which 
utilize honeypots to gather data about attacker behavior after system compromise. These 
studies have generally modeled attacker behavior after ingress into a system without any 
warning message and found, contrary to their expectations, that if there is no explicit 
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sanction threat few hackers engage in behaviors designed to conceal their malicious 
activity. Alata et al. (2006) find that only 14 of 38 intruders attempted to delete the file 
containing the history of their commands, and Salles-Lostau et al. (2011) similarly find 
that while more than 90% of attackers checked the system for the presence of other users 
and almost 80% changed the account password, less than 60% hid their actions. A study 
by Berthier et al. (2009) found that while the second most installed software were 
‘Bouncers’ (designed to hide source IP addresses and hostnames by relaying 
connections), only 26% of sessions contained commands to hide the attacker’s intrusion. 
However most of the sessions were short and lasted less than one minute, and some 
attackers compulsively using the command w to make sure no other legitimate user could 
connect while they were engaged in their attacks (Berthier et al., 2009). These findings 
partially support Alata et al.’s (2006) conclusion that most hackers fail to engage in 
activities to avoid detection, although it would seem that at least some are mindful of the 
need to employ restrictive deterrence strategies, and that some restrictive deterrence 
strategies may be more common than others. This relatively low level of mindfulness of 
the need for strategies to lower the odds of detection in the absence of warning messages 
is, if anything, fortunate for the present experiment since the fact that hackers do not 
seem to overwhelmingly engage in acts designed to reduce their chances of detection 
when faced with a lack of warning messages means that it should be easier to detect any 
restrictive deterrent effect when warning banners are introduced. 
The only previous work to explicitly and empirically investigate the deterrent 
effect of warnings in cyberspace is that conducted by Maimon et al. (2014). Similar to the 
present study, their study was set up so that upon unauthorized entry to a honeypot, 
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system trespassers were randomly assigned to either a warning (treatment) or no-warning 
(control) computer. They found that while the presence of a warning banner did not seem 
to be associated with an immediate termination or a reduction in the frequency of 
trespassing incidents, it did significantly reduce the duration of such incidents. They 
interpreted their results as suggesting that while warning messages in cyberspace do not 
seem to have an absolute deterrent effect (inasmuch as they do not seem to prevent 
criminal activity) they may have a restrictive deterrent effect. The results suggest that 
trespassers attempt to restrict the time they spend on the system after being confronted by 
a warning banner in an attempt to minimize their chances of detection and thus penalty. 
 
4.1 Procedures 
The present study thus builds on the suppositions of the Maimon et al. (2014) 
paper in investigating the potential restrictive deterrent effects of warning messages. 
However, where the Maimon et al. (2014) experiment utilized only one experimental 
condition (the presence of a warning banner) and one control condition (no message), the 
present study utilizes three experimental conditions in addition to the control (see 
Appendix A). To ensure the collection of sufficient data across the four conditions and a 
randomized experimental design, attackers were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions after successfully breaking into the target computers. Specifically, trespassers 
were allowed access once they had attempted to ‘brute force’ an entry (i.e. trying to guess 
the password by trying multiple possible keys) a predefined number of times. This 
threshold was randomly set at between 150 and 200 attempts. Once they had accessed the 
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system computers, all of which ran Linux Ubuntu 9.10 with a modified version of an 
OpenSSH server, trespassers were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
The four conditions consisted of a control condition with no message; an 
‘altruistic’ message aimed at moral persuasion (Warning 1); a legal sanction threat 
consistent with restrictive deterrent theorization (Warning 2); and a non-specific 
(ambiguous) threat (Warning 3) (see Appendix A for the content of the warning banners). 
There is little in the extant literature to inform estimates of the relative efficacy of these 
three experimental conditions, but the research hypotheses discussed above describe 
some a priori assumptions regarding the expected findings. 
Trespassers were then allowed access to the target computer, and able to initiate 
repeated system trespassing incidents, for a period of 30 days. They were free to use the 
computer as they liked, but a firewall was employed to ensure that they did not engage in 
activities dangerous to other systems. Their keystrokes were logged using the Sebek 
keylogger. At the end of the 30-day period they were blocked from the target computer, it 
was cleaned and redeployed on the network so that others might access it. 
 
4.2 Data 
In total 1,231 sessions were logged across 295 deployments: 325 on the control 
honeypot (no warning message), 189 on the first experimental condition (altruistic 
warning message), 344 on the second experimental condition (standard legal warning 
message) and 373 on the third (ambiguous warning message). Of those sessions, 425 
have keystrokes logged: 120 on the control honeypot, 62 on the first experimental 
condition, 125 on the second condition and 118 on the third condition. We cannot 
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speculate as to what causes some system trespassers to log onto the system and then fail 
to use it whilst others enter keystrokes, nor is there any obvious way in which we might 
obtain the data necessary to make such deductions. Overall there is an average of roughly 
4 sessions per honeypot deployment. 
[ INSERT TABLE 1. ] 
 
 The present study moves beyond an analysis of attack frequency and duration and 
builds on the prior work of Ramsbrock et al. (2007) and Berthier et al. (2009) in 
examining the commands used by attackers confronted with each of the study conditions 
through analysis of keystroke data. Keystroke data refers to the output data when 
keystrokes are logged; that is, when the typing activity of individuals on a system is 
recorded and transcribed. For the present study this logging is carried out covertly, and 
the end-product is a dataset consisting of a list of all keys typed by individuals as they 
trespass into the system. From this it is possible to isolate and analyze the commands 
entered by system trespassers.  
Overall, 14 individual commands were examined in the present study. These 
commands are first studied individually, in order to address the contention that certain 
commands may be utilized more frequently on systems with warning banners for reasons 
of particularistic deterrence, while others may be used less frequently for reasons of 
probabilistic deterrence. The 14 commands are then divided into three categories and 
analyzed with reference to their general function. Here I follow the example set by 
previous work on post-system compromise attacker behavior which looks at attacker 
behavior with reference to the general function of commands (Berthier et al., 2009; 
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Ramsbrock et al., 2007). Here I investigate whether different forms of hacker 
engagement with the system may be affected differently by the various warning 
messages. This is something that has not been considered in the context of deterrence 
before, however, and so I have no theoretical basis for predicting what differences may 
occur or for which command groupings. My hypotheses predict, in accordance with most 
theory on probabilistic and particularistic restrictive deterrence, a decrease in the usage of 
all commands upon confrontation with a warning, but it is possible that commands 
displaying certain functions may be reduced more or less severely compared to other 
types of command. The three categories into which the 14 commands are divided are 
labeled as Change commands, Reconnaissance commands and Fetch commands. Change 
commands are those commands that change files, access permissions or processes on the 
computer. The commands included as such are adduser/useradd, passwd, chmod, rm -rf, 
touch and kill/killall. The Reconnaissance commands are designed to report information 
about the computer’s contents and processes. The commands considered here are w, 
uname, ps, uptime and ls. The third category of Fetch commands are designed to fetch 
files from other networks and bring them to the compromised computer. The commands 
included here are wget, tar and ftp.	  Table 2 presents a list of these commands as well as 
their description. 
 [ INSERT TABLE 2 ] 
 
4.3 Methods  
I ran power analyses to confirm that the sample sizes used were sufficient to 
correctly reject the null hypothesis when it is false, i.e. that my sample was large enough 
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that it would be able to find significant differences should they exist and calculate a 
sufficiently accurate estimate of the effect sizes for any significant differences. For this I 
used the power analysis software G*Power. The current data has enough power at the 
generally accepted standard of π = 0.80 to detect a medium effect size of r = 0.25 at an 
alpha level of 0.05, which is the accepted significance level. I should therefore be able to 
detect and measure with sufficient accuracy falsifications of the null hypothesis and 
significant findings in my data analysis.  
To analyze the data, I first created a ‘proportion’ measure for each individual 
command which represents the proportion of honeypots deployed upon which that 
individual command had been logged one or more times. This was to allow comparison 
across treatment conditions of the proportion of honeypots logging commands as 
compared to those where the command was not logged at all. I then created a second 
‘rate’ measure for each individual command which represents the rate at which those 
commands were entered on each deployment. On average the number of system 
trespassing incidents per deployment was roughly 4 (see Table 1.), but when I used this 
to create rates of command usage per individual deployment the resulting rates were very 
low (several decimal places past zero) and thus I instead created a command usage rate 
per 10 trespassing incidents. I then created new rate measures for the three command 
categories discussed above (Change, Reconnaissance and Fetch) by combining the rates 
of usage of the individual commands in each category. These rates are also calculated per 
10 trespassing incidents. 
 Due to the set-up of this experiment, there are no additional variables that must be 
controlled for, nor is there any sample selection bias. The collected data may thus be 
	   28	  
analyzed without the use of statistical regression. Instead, I use several statistical methods 
designed to find significant differences across treatment conditions and between paired 
conditions – that is, to find differences which are highly unlikely to be coincidental, and 
thus which indicate some effect of the presence of a warning message on system 
trespasser command use.  
 I analyzed the proportion data using a chi-squared test. The chi-squared test 
examines ‘goodness of fit’, that is, how closely observed data conforms to the data we 
would expect from a population with a normal distribution, and then tests for significant 
differences if the observed and expected data are at variance. Here, if there were no effect 
of any warning banner, we would expect to see no difference in the proportion of 
honeypots registering command use across treatment conditions. Where a significant 
difference is shown, we can conclude that there is only a 5% or 10% probability 
(depending upon our chosen level of significance) that this finding is due to chance, and 
therefore that the difference is a result of the presence of a warning message. 
 I analyzed the rates first using one-way ANOVA. One-way analysis of variance 
compares the means across samples using the F distribution, and finds significant 
differences between those means by testing whether the samples seem to be drawn from 
populations with the same mean values. Where means are found to be significantly 
different, this suggests that the samples do not come from similar populations. Given that 
treatment conditions are randomly assigned, the population of system trespassers itself 
should exhibit no significant or systematic differences across treatment conditions prior 
to the introduction of a warning message. Thus our null hypothesis for the purposes of 
one-way ANOVA testing is that the population across samples should exhibit the same 
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mean, unless warning messages have an effect. If we do see significant differences, 
therefore, we can conclude with a high probability that warning messages bring about a 
change in attacker behavior (specifically, here, a change in the frequency of command 
usage). I also ran Tukey’s test on each command to find if the means for each treatment 
condition were significantly different to each other. This method is more suited to the 
present study than simple t-testing, since it is more conservative when there are unequal 
sample sizes, as there are in the present study due to the lower number of system 
trespassing incidents registered for the first treatment condition (the altruistic warning 
message). Tukey’s test gives an idea of whether there is a significant difference in the 
rate of commands logged across honeypot type by comparing each possible set of paired 
conditions. Where a pair registers a significant difference, it can be concluded to the 
appropriate degree of probability that those two conditions come from populations with 
different means – i.e., populations that are substantially different to each other. Given the 
nature of the current experiment, that difference can only come from the effect of the 
warning message. 
 I then ran both one-way ANOVA and Tukey’s tests for the Change 
(adduser/useradd, passwd, chmod, rm -rf, touch and kill/killall), Reconnaissance (w, 
uname, ps, uptime and ls) and Fetch (wget, tar and ftp) grouping rates. This was to see if 
there were significant differences first in the frequency of command usage between all 
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I look first at the proportion of honeypot deployments in which each command is 
used, and then compare these proportions by treatment condition. Table 3 shows the 
proportion of all honeypots deployed where a command was logged. This data alone does 
not tell us how many times a command was used on each honeypot, but demonstrates the 
relative number of honeypots that logged a certain command in comparison to those 
which never logged that command. This data allows one to determine which warning 
messages affect whether or not a command is used at all. Chi-squared testing reveals two 
significant findings. There are significant differences between the three treatment groups 
and the control for the proportion of honeypots logging the command rm –rf, at a 
significance level of p < 0.05, and for the command chmod at a one-tailed significance 
level of p < 0.05. Rm –rf is a command that functions as a delete-all, and is used to 
remove files and directories. The chmod command changes the access permissions for 
files, allowing intruders to read and edit previously restricted files. Both commands thus 
wreak changes upon the computer system and are classified as ‘Change’ commands. It is 
possible that they may be used in a malicious manner, to edit or delete files on the 
original system, but one can only speculate as to the intentions behind the use of these 
commands. In both cases a far lower proportion of the altruistic than the ambiguous 
honeypots log the command. Indeed a general pattern is quite striking when one looks at 
the data in Table 3. Although there are no further significant differences, for most 
commands (11 out of 14) altruistic honeypots register a lower proportion of command 
usage than the other three conditions, which are generally largely similar to each other. 
For instance, the command ps, which is a ‘Reconnaissance’ command that reports on 
current processes, is used on 18.97% of altruistic honeypots but on between 25.64% and 
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29.63% of honeypots for the other three conditions, despite statistical testing finding no 
significant difference across conditions. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3. ] 
The proportion of honeypots logging each command only gives us part of the 
picture, however. It is also important to consider how many times the command was used 
on each honeypot, in order to assess whether command usage was truly higher or lower 
across treatment conditions. On average each deployment consisted of 4.17 trespassing 
incidents, but in order to make the data more amenable to visual analysis the rate of 
command use was calculated for 10 sessions. One-way ANOVA analysis of the 
differences between all condition types reveals significant differences in the rates of 
usage of the chmod command at a one-tailed level of p < 0.05. Tukey’s test finds that for 
chmod there is a significant difference between the altruistic message and the ambiguous 
warning at a one-tailed level of p < 0.05. Again, most of the commands (11 out of 14) 
show a non-significant lower rate of command usage for the altruistic message condition 
as compared to the other three conditions. There is therefore a clear pattern that the moral 
persuasion message is working to reduce both the incidence and the frequency of most 
commands, albeit mostly at non-significant levels. The three commands for which the 
altruistic condition does not log the lowest proportion of commands are adduser, passwd 
and wget, whilst the three commands for which the altruistic condition does not record 
the lowest rate of occurrence are adduser, wget and tar. Looking at the function of these 
commands as compared to the other commands studied (see Table 2.) there is no obvious 
theoretical reason why they should be higher for the altruistic condition. Given that there 
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is no significant difference for either proportion or rate for any of these commands, it 
seems likely that their higher incidence is merely coincidental. 
[ INSERT TABLE 4. ]  
 
Finally I looked to see if there were differences in the rate of usage of commands 
as divided into three categories with reference to their function. While I predicted that all 
three categories would experience a reduction on the treated honeypots, I followed the 
example of previous work on system trespasser behavior (albeit simplified for the present 
study in recognition of the smaller sample size and reduced number of commands 
studied) in looking at the various ways an attacker might engage with the system – 
through changing aspects of the system (Change), through the use of commands designed 
to gain information about the system and its processes (Reconnaissance), and by bringing 
files from remote networks onto the hacked system (Fetch) (see Berthier et al., 2009; 
Ramsbrock et al., 2007). Neither the Fetch nor Reconnaissance groupings demonstrated 
any significant differences across treatment conditions, but the Change grouping showed 
a difference across condition types at a one-tailed significance level of p < 0.05 under 
one-way ANOVA testing, while Tukey’s test revealed a difference between the altruistic 
and the ambiguous warning at a one-tailed significance level of p < 0.05. It is likely that 
this finding of significance is driven by the fact that the Change group includes the two 
commands that yield significant differences on their own – the chmod and rm –rf 
commands. Yet the findings suggest that while there is no significant difference in 
reconnaissance activities or those directed towards bringing files onto the system from 
remote networks, tampering with data and access permissions within the computer is 
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lessened by the presence of the moral persuasion message, especially as compared to an 
ambiguous threatening message.  
[ INSERT TABLE 5. ] 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Discussion 
 System trespassing, or the unauthorized entry of individuals into a computer 
system, is one of the many forms of cybercrime that has become a growing concern with 
the spread of computer technologies worldwide (Bursztein, 2013; Hernandez-Castro and 
Boiten, 2013). Yet this area has remained largely unexamined within the context of 
criminology, despite offering a novel arena in which to test established criminological 
theory. The present study is among the first (see also Maimon et al., 2014) to apply 
deterrence theory to the realm of cyberspace. The experiment conducted seeks to 
establish the restrictive deterrent effect of textual computer warnings on the behavior of 
system trespassers once they have entered a computer system. The focus is on the 
restrictive deterrence identified by Gibbs (1975) and refined by Jacobs (1993, 1996a), 
examining whether the presence of a warning message causes a decrease in the number of 
commands entered after system entry in an attempt to limit the chances of detection. By 
utilizing not a single warning message but three messages which comprise a ‘generic’ 
legal sanction threat, a moral persuasion message and an ambiguous warning, the present 
study seeks to establish not only whether the presence of a warning message matters, but 
whether the type of message makes a difference to attacker behavior. The conclusion that 
can be reached is that the type of message does indeed matter, with some substantial 
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evidence indicating that while we do not find the predicted restrictive deterrent effect for 
the legal sanction threat or the ambiguous warning, we do find a reduction in attacker 
activity for the moral persuasion message, in line with some (albeit not all) of the 
previous research comparing the effects of moral persuasion and legal warnings 
(Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; although see Ariel, 2010; 
Tittle and Rowe, 1973). 
The hypothesis for which I find the greatest evidence is Hypothesis 2 – that a 
message of moral persuasion will cause a decrease in the commands used by a system 
trespasser on a compromised computer system. There is evidence of significant 
reductions in command usage for two commands – chmod and rm –rf – as well as for the 
‘Change’ category within which these commands fall. Overall there is also an 
insignificant but clear pattern of lower command usage on the ‘altruistic’ condition 
honeypots. This holds true for both the proportion of honeypots registering commands 
and for the frequency of command usage. There is thus some substantial evidence that the 
presence of a moral persuasion message causes system trespassers to reduce their 
criminal activity on the system, in line with some of the findings testing the efficacy of 
moral persuasion in reducing the occurrence of other forms of criminal activity, such as 
tax evasion (see for example Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Schwartz and Orleans, 
1967). The reduction in activity for the Change command grouping as opposed to the 
Reconnaissance or Fetch groupings suggests that it is primarily that activity where 
trespassers alter (or damage) the system which is reduced by the presence of a moral 
persuasion message. Reconnaissance activity which merely reports on system processes 
(and is therefore less ‘intrusive’) is not affected, but neither is ‘Fetch’ activity which 
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involves the bringing of files into the network. One might expect Fetch to be affected in a 
similar manner to Change, given that it also alters the contents of the computer system, 
and why the one is affected but not the other is unclear. It may be that a dataset with a 
higher power might identify differences that cannot be detected in the present data, or 
that an investigation of the contents of the files imported by Fetch commands might 
explain the different behavior of the Fetch and Change categories. 
There is considerably less evidence in favor of Hypotheses 2 and 3, however. No 
significant differences are found between the proportion or rates of commands on the 
second and third treatment conditions as compared to the control condition, and in fact 
there is a mild suggestion of a pattern favoring a higher proportion and rate of command 
usage on the two treatment conditions (especially condition 3), in contradiction of my 
prediction. For 9 out of the 14 commands a higher proportion of legal standard honeypots 
registered a command usage as compared to the control, whilst ambiguous honeypots 
registered higher for 13 out of 14 commands. The legal standard honeypot type registered 
a higher rate of use than the control condition for 8 out of 14 commands, whilst the 
ambiguous warning registered a higher rate for 12 out of 14. It is unclear why the two 
conditions suggest higher rates of criminal activity than the control, and it may be that 
trespassers on those two conditions are in fact increasing their use of commands designed 
to conceal their activity and their presence on the system, similar to the form of 
particularistic restrictive deterrent response described by Cherbonneau and Copes (2006) 
where there is not necessarily a reduction in criminal activity (and there may in fact be a 
increase) because of the attacker’s response to a legal sanction threat (see also Gallupe et 
al., 2011; Wright and Decker, 1994). In the context of the present study, however, the 
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commands alone do not allow us to conclude whether or not system trespassers are acting 
with such an intention. Given the insignificant nature of the findings regarding the legal 
sanction threat and the ambiguous warning, one can only conclude that no restrictive 
deterrence seems to be taking place. 
There is some, again insignificant evidence that suggests a difference between the 
generic legal warning and the ambiguous warning, although in the opposite direction 
from that predicted in Hypothesis 4. The data in Tables 3 and 4 show that a higher 
proportion of ambiguous honeypots log commands for 10 out of the 14 commands, and 
that there is a higher rate of command entry on the ambiguous honeypots for 8 out of the 
14 commands. We thus see a greater increase of command usage relative to the control 
condition for the ambiguous honeypot type, perhaps in line with a particularistic deterrent 
approach encouraging an increase in commands designed to shield the attacker from 
detection, although again that is mere speculation. The relative similarity of the data for 
the control condition and the generic legal warning may be explained by system 
trespassers failing to read, or even take much notice of the legal warning, as opposed to 
the other two warnings. Anyone who spends much time on the internet will encounter 
similarly structured and worded warnings frequently (when logging on to restricted 
access systems in universities or workplaces, signing up for accounts with social 
networking sites such as Facebook or joining public wifi services in establishments such 
as Starbucks) and these warnings tend to have a generic layout and content. It may be, 
then, that people do not bother to read the legal warning, since they assume that they 
know its contents already and are used to encountering and disregarding such messages 
with some considerable frequency. If people fail to read the legal warning, it will operate 
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much like the control condition (that is, as if there were no warning at all). By contrast, 
the altruistic warning and ambiguous warning, due to their different layout and content, 
are less likely to be immediately dismissed by trespassers. System trespassers may be 
more likely to read these messages, and thus they are able to influence behavior, in 
whatever form that may take. This may be why we see a greater difference with 
comparison to the control condition for both the proportion and rates of command usage 
for these two conditions. Again, however, the differences for all but the altruistic warning 




Whilst most findings fail to reach the commonly accepted level of significance, 
the results which do meet this level of significance, in addition to the general patterns 
visible in the data (despite not proving significant under statistical testing), are quite 
strongly suggestive that a moral persuasion message affects computer system trespasser 
behavior. The data suggest quite strongly that the altruistic honeypot condition is 
associated with a lower rate of command usage across all commands, with moral 
persuasion having a greater impact on reducing both the incidence and the frequency of 
system trespasser behavior than the other warning message types. Indeed if anything the 
presence of a legal warning or an ambiguous threatening message seems to increase 
command usage, perhaps in line with the potential particularistic restrictive deterrence 
response identified by Cherbonneau and Copes (2006) amongst others, although none of 
these findings were significant so strong conclusions cannot be formed and it is not 
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possible to test for a particularistic restrictive deterrent effect with the current data. 
Generally the results of this study, although not strongly conclusive, suggest that 
restrictive deterrence does not occur in response to legal threats in cyberspace, perhaps 
due to the low perceived certainty and severity of punishment (Chiesa et al., 2009; Choi, 
2010; Taylor, 1999; Yar, 2006). There is, however, an effect of moral persuasion in 
reducing criminal activity, and this indicates potential avenues for future study of the 
ways in which moral persuasion may be employed to reduce (cyber)crime and the 
methods by which it accomplishes this. 
Future study of the effect of moral persuasion (and legal threat) on cybercrime is 
important not just for theory but for policy. It is important to know what effect different 
types of warning messages have on system trespasser behavior in order that system 
administrators can learn how to protect their systems (and the data contained therein) to 
the best of their ability. The present study suggests that the primary approach to deterring 
system trespassers or others who would abuse computer privileges - use of a threat of 
legal sanction – is not only ineffective in reducing criminal behavior but may in fact 
increase it, or (in line with some forms of a particularistic restrictive deterrent response) 
encourage criminals to employ commands that make their activity and presence harder to 
detect. By contrast, a message which appeals to the moral sensibilities of system 
trespassers has a higher success rate in reducing the activity of trespassers on computer 
systems, and may be a more effective method of ensuring system safety. In the present 
study, the two commands which were logged much less often and less frequently for the 
altruistic condition are both potentially damaging commands from the point of view of a 
system administrator – chmod changes access permissions and rm –rf is a delete-all for 
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files and directories. Reducing the incidence of these commands amongst others during a 
trespass incident is certainly in the interests of a system administrator. The present study 
thus has important ramifications for policy approaches, inasmuch as it suggests practical 
methods by which unwanted system activity may be reduced and computer network 
safety increased. 
  
6.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
 The present study represents a first move towards addressing an important and 
understudied issue: that is, how effective are computer warnings at preventing unlawful 
system access? The present study looks specifically at the effect of various warning 
messages on system trespassing activity. The tendency for system administrators, 
websites and online service providers to use textual warnings to try and discourage either 
system trespassing or abuse of system privileges seems to be based on an assumption that 
deterrent principles are effective, yet this has rarely been tested in practice. Given the 
desire of system administrators to protect their systems, it is important to know whether 
or not warning messages are effective, and which type are most effective, in encouraging 
individuals to restrain their criminal activity. It is also important to know whether 
warning messages encourage system trespassers to conceal their activity, because this 
will make them potentially more difficult to detect. Therefore experiments such as the 
one discussed in the present work are important in practical terms for suggesting ways in 
which systems may be made safer and the data on them protected more effectively. 
 The present study is limited in its conclusions partly by the paucity of significant 
findings. It may be that a study on a larger scale will find more clearly defined patterns in 
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the data that can corroborate the conclusions tentatively drawn here. The current sample 
size was only large enough to find moderate effects with an effect size of 0.25. 
Additionally, there are some commands that may be used frequently enough in a larger 
study to warrant inclusion in the analysis which may shed more light on the ways in 
which differing treatment conditions affect the usage of different commands. These 
commands may make it easier to isolate any particularistic restrictive deterrence 
responses which may take the form, as suggested by Cherbonneau and Copes amongst 
others (Cherbonneau and Copes, 2006; see also Gallupe et al., 2011; Wright and Decker, 
1994), of attempts to avoid detection through the usage of commands for that purpose. 
This type of particularistic restrictive deterrence approach might in fact yield an increase 
in command usage as the attacker seeks to reduce their chances of detection by using 
commands to conceal their presence, in line with the third type of particularistic 
restrictive deterrent response identified by Jacobs (2010). This constitutes the opposite of 
the effect of either a probabilistic restrictive deterrence response or the particularistic 
restrictive deterrence response first identified by Gibbs (1975) and given by Jacobs as the 
first type of particularistic restrictive deterrent response in his 2010 typology. In the 
present study, it was not possible to isolate this potential effect (although there was little 
solid evidence of one) since the intent of the system trespasser in using any of the 
commands studied could not be known. This is a problem that future work should attempt 
to address, perhaps through ethnographic work on self-identified system trespassers 
similar to that conducted by Jacobs on drug dealers where this type of potential restrictive 
deterrent effect was first identified (1993, 1996a). 
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A further limitation is that the results of the present study are applicable only to a 
subset of system trespassers – likely the less skilled or purposeful hackers, who select 
targets for intrusion based on port-scanning techniques that locate easy targets. It is 
debatable whether system trespassers who consciously select their targets and enter them 
using a high degree of skill in order to access specific information would be affected by 
warning messages in the same way (if at all). It is unclear how many system trespassers 
fall into the first camp (unskilled and selecting targets at random) as opposed to the 
second (skilled and goal-focused), although logically one might suppose there are more 
in the former than the latter. Research on the proportion of system trespassers who 
consciously target specific systems as opposed to targeting easily-accessed systems at 
random would inform the applicability of the present study’s findings. 
 In general, however, the present study constitutes one of the first attempts to 
apply deterrence theory to the cyber realm. The findings are preliminary, but suggest 
some directions for future research in investigating the relative effect of attempts at moral 
persuasion and legal sanction threats in reducing the criminal behavior of trespassers on 
computer systems. It is hoped that such research will inform the decisions of system 
administrators in their mission to maintain the safety of their networks and the protection 
of the data housed therein. 
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7. TABLES 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: Honeypot Deployments and Sessions 
 









No. of trepassing 
incidents  with 
keystrokes 
Control 78 325 4.17 120 
Altruistic 
Warning 
58 189 3.25 62 
Legal Warning 78 344 4.41 125 
Ambiguous 
Warning 
81 373 4.60 118 




TABLE 2. Command List 
 
Command Description of Command 
w Shows whether other users are logged into 
the system and their activity 
uname Reports basic information about the 
computer’s hardware and software 
uptime Shows whether other users are logged on 
and how long the system has been running 
ps Reports on current processes 
adduser / useradd Creates a new user account 
passwd Changes the password 
chmod Changes access permissions 
rm -rf Functions as a delete-all 
touch Creates new, empty files and is used to 
change timestamps 
kill / killall Terminates processes 
wget Downloads files 
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tar Extracts files 
ftp Transfers files from or to a remote network 




TABLE 3. Proportion (as a percentage) of deployments where a command was used 













w 40.34 39.74 36.21 41.03 43.21 
uname 18.64 17.95 12.07 20.51 22.22 
uptime 4.41 5.13 1.72 6.41 3.70 
ps 25.76 26.92 18.97 25.64 29.63 
adduser 2.37 1.28 1.72 2.56 3.70 
passwd 42.03 42.31 37.93 37.18 49.38 
chmod	  * 16.61 12.82 8.62 19.23 23.46 
rm	  –rf	  ** 20 19.23 8.62 19.23 29.63 
touch 2.37 2.56 1.72 2.56 2.47 
kill 11.53 10.26 8.62 11.54 14.81 
wget 25.08 23.08 27.59 24.36 25.93 
tar 15.93 15.38 12.07 12.82 22.22 
ftp 3.73 2.56 1.72 5.13 4.94 
ls 29.15 25.64 20.69 34.62 33.33 
* Chi-squared test is significant at a one-tailed level of p<0.05. 
** Chi-squared test is significant at a level of p<0.05. 
 













w 1.66 1.73 1.43 1.72 1.70 
uname 0.66 0.52 0.48 0.78 0.82 
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uptime 0.19 0.26 0.06 0.21 0.21 
ps 0.87 1.12 0.61 0.78 0.91 
adduser 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.10 
passwd 1.48 1.33 1.31 1.37 1.86 
chmod	  * 0.43 0.38 0.21** 0.37 0.69 
rm	  –rf	   0.66 0.74 0.29 0.68 0.84 
touch 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.10 
kill 0.26 0.32 0.17 0.27 0.27 
wget 1.00 0.90 1.01 1.15 0.94 
tar 0.44 0.50 0.32 0.31 0.61 
ftp 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.12 
ls 1.14 1.09 0.79 1.43 1.18 
* One-way ANOVA test is significant at a one-tailed level of p<0.05. 
** Tukey’s test finds a significant difference between the Altruistic Warning condition and the Ambiguous 
Warning condition at a one-tailed level of p<0.05. 
 
TABLE 5. Rate of command usage per 10 sessions for command groupings Change, 













Change * 2.95 2.87 2.05** 2.76 4.83 
Reconnaissance 4.53 4.71 3.37 4.92 4.82 
Fetch 1.59 1.55 1.41 1.68 1.67 
* One-way ANOVA testing is significant at a one-tailed level of p<0.05. 
** Tukey’s test is significant for a difference between the Altruistic Warning condition and the Ambiguous 
Warning condition at p<0.05 one-tailed. 
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APPENDIX A. Warning Banners Displayed 
 
Panel A. Altruistic Warning (Treatment 1): 
Greetings friend, 
We congratulate you on gaining access to our system, but must request that you not 




Panel B. University of Maryland Standard Legal Warning (Treatment 2): 
The actual or attempted unauthorized access, use, or modification of this system is 
strictly prohibited. Unauthorized users are subject to Institutional disciplinary 
proceedings and/or criminal and civil penalties under state, federal, or other applicable 
domestic or foreign laws. The use of this system is monitored and recorded for 
administrative and security reasons. Anyone accessing this system expressly consents to 
such monitoring and is advised that if monitoring reveals possible evidence of criminal 
activity, the Institution may provide evidence of such activity to law enforcement 
officials. 
 
Panel C. Ambiguous Warning (Treatment 3): 
We have acquired your IP address. 
Logout now and there will not be any consequences. 
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